Encryption at rest and in transit
Encryption protects data in two states. Data at rest sits in storage; data in transit moves between systems. AWS services offer encryption for both, and the customer decides how to use it. Data at rest · Data in transit
How it works
- At rest: storage services encrypt data with keys. AWS KMS creates and controls those keys and integrates with services such as Amazon S3, Amazon EBS and Amazon RDS.
- In transit: TLS encrypts connections. AWS Certificate Manager issues and renews the TLS certificates.
- Private paths: AWS PrivateLink keeps traffic on the Amazon network instead of the internet.
| State | Protects | AWS tools |
|---|---|---|
| At rest | Data in storage | AWS KMS keys, server-side encryption in S3, EBS, RDS |
| In transit | Data moving between systems | TLS with ACM certificates, AWS PrivateLink, VPN |
Exam cues
- If the question says manage the keys that encrypt stored data, think AWS KMS.
- If the question says HTTPS certificates, think ACM.
- If the question says protect data moving over the network, think encryption in transit (TLS).
- If the question says encrypt an existing unencrypted RDS instance, think snapshot copy with encryption and restore, because RDS encryption is set at creation.
Remember
- KMS keys never leave AWS KMS unencrypted.
- RDS encryption is set at creation; encrypt a snapshot copy and restore it to encrypt an existing unencrypted instance.
Trap: TLS certificates protect data in transit, not at rest. For stored data, the answer is server-side encryption with AWS KMS keys.
From the AWS docs (8)
- Data at rest is data persisted in non-volatile storage, such as block storage, object storage, databases and archives; encryption and access controls reduce the risk of unauthorized access to it.
- Data in transit is data sent from one system to another, inside a workload or between services and end users; protecting it preserves confidentiality and integrity.
- Encryption transforms content so it is unreadable without the secret key needed to decrypt it back to plaintext.
- AWS Key Management Service (AWS KMS) creates and controls the keys used to encrypt and sign data; KMS keys are protected by FIPS 140-3 Security Level 3 validated HSMs and never leave AWS KMS unencrypted.
- AWS KMS integrates with other AWS services to encrypt data at rest or in transit; common uses are encrypting Amazon EBS volumes, Amazon S3 buckets and Amazon RDS databases.
- AWS Certificate Manager (ACM) creates, stores and renews public and private SSL/TLS certificates that protect AWS websites and applications.
- AWS PrivateLink keeps traffic between a VPC or on-premises network and services on the Amazon backbone, so it does not traverse the internet.
- An Amazon RDS DB instance can be encrypted only when it is created; to encrypt an existing one, copy an unencrypted snapshot with encryption and restore it.
Encryption defaults and key ownership
AWS services offer encryption defaults and settings for stored data. Knowing which service applies a default and who controls a key helps you choose the right setting. S3 defaults · KMS keys
How it works
- Amazon S3 automatically encrypts new object uploads with server-side encryption using S3 managed keys (SSE-S3). CloudTrail log files delivered to S3 use SSE-S3 by default, or server-side encryption with a KMS key (SSE-KMS) when you choose a key. S3 · CloudTrail
- AWS Storage Gateway uses TLS for data in transit and SSE-S3 by default for data it stores in S3. New Amazon Redshift provisioned clustersA group of CloudHSM devices managed together as the backing key store. are encrypted by default, except that the change does not affect clusters restored from snapshots. Storage Gateway · Redshift
- Choose encryption at rest when creating an Amazon EFS file system. You cannot add it to an unencrypted file system later.
- Choose a KMS key type by who controls it. You create and control customer managed keys; an AWS service creates AWS managed keys in your account and owns AWS owned keys.
Exam cues
- If the question says new S3 uploads without an encryption setting, think SSE-S3, because S3 encrypts new uploads automatically.
- If the question says full control of a KMS key, think customer managed key, because you create and control it.
- If the question says add encryption to an existing unencrypted EFS file system, think creation time, because its encryption setting cannot be added later.
Remember
- Since January 5, 2023, S3 encrypts new uploads with SSE-S3 using AES-256, at no extra cost or performance impact.
- Since January 10, 2025, new Redshift provisioned clusters are encrypted by default; the change does not affect clusters restored from snapshots.
- AWS managed keys are a legacy type; AWS owned keys are used by services for encryption by default.
Trap: Encryption defaults differ by service. EFS encryption at rest is set at creation, while S3 automatically encrypts new uploads.
From the AWS docs (6)
- Since January 5, 2023, Amazon S3 automatically encrypts all new object uploads with SSE-S3 (AES-256) at no additional cost and with no performance impact.
- CloudTrail log files delivered to S3 are encrypted by default with SSE-S3, or with SSE-KMS if you choose a KMS key.
- AWS Storage Gateway encrypts data in transit with TLS and, by default, encrypts the data it stores in Amazon S3 with SSE-S3.
- Amazon EFS encryption at rest is set when the file system is created and can't be added to an unencrypted file system later.
- Since January 10, 2025, new Amazon Redshift provisioned clusters are encrypted by default; clusters restored from snapshots are not affected.
- KMS keys are customer managed keys (you create and control them), AWS managed keys (created in your account by a service, a legacy type) and AWS owned keys (owned by a service, used for encryption by default).
Key policies and grants
AWS KMS authorizes key management and cryptographic operationsAn operation that uses key material for work such as encryption, decryption, or authentication., such as encryption and decryption, through key policies, IAM policies, and grantsA removable permission allowing a grantee selected operations on one KMS key.. A key policyA resource permission document that controls access to one KMS key. is the permission document attached to one key. A principalAn identity making an AWS request, such as a user, role, or service. is the identity making the request, such as a user, role, or AWS service.
How it works
- Start with the key policy. Every KMS key has exactly one, and it controls that key in its own Region.
- For IAM-based access, allow IAM delegation in the key policy, then grant the caller the required operation in IAM. The default account-principal statement uses the account root ARNAn identifier for an AWS resource., an AWS resource identifier, and
kms:*to enable that delegation. It does not grant every identity access. - The console default policy adds the selected key administrators and key users to the account-delegation statement.
- For policy-based access from another account, allow access in the owning key policy and in the caller account’s IAM policy. An IAM deny can still block access even when IAM delegation is not enabled.
- For task-specific access, create a grant, a removable set of allowed operations on one key. Its granteeThe identity receiving the permissions specified by a grant. is the identity receiving permission. Limit a symmetric keyA key where the same secret is used for encryption and decryption. grant with encryption contextNon-secret key-value information authenticated with symmetric-key ciphertext., non-secret key-value data bound to the ciphertextData transformed by encryption that must be decrypted to recover the original.. Retire or revoke the grant to remove its permissions.
| Access mechanism | Where it belongs | What it does |
|---|---|---|
| Key policy | On one KMS key | Defines key access and can enable IAM delegation |
| IAM policy | On an identity | Grants delegated permissions or explicitly denies access |
| Grant | On one key for a grantee | Allows selected operations until retired or revoked |
Programmatic creation without a supplied policy produces the account-delegation statement.
Exam cues
- If the question says IAM allows decrypt but KMS denies it, think key-policy delegation and explicit denies, because an IAM allow needs the key policy’s permission to delegate.
- If the question says another account must use a key, think both owning key policy and caller IAM policy, because neither policy alone completes policy-based cross-account access.
- If the question says a service needs access for a task, think a grant, because the service can use and retire that permission without editing policies.
Remember
- Exactly one key policy per key; its scope is Regional.
- The account-principal statement enables IAM delegation.
- Grants allow operations and can be retired or revoked.
Trap: The default account-principal statement enables IAM delegation; it does not give every IAM identity access to the key.
The caller account IAM policy and the owning account key policy must both authorize policy-based cross-account use.
From the AWS docs (14)
- Every KMS key must have exactly one key policy.
- A key policy is the resource permission document controlling who can manage or use its KMS key.
- A key policy applies to its key in its Region, not to keys in other Regions.
- IAM allow policies grant access only when the key policy enables IAM delegation.
- An IAM deny applies even when the key policy does not enable IAM delegation.
- The default account-principal statement uses the account root ARN and kms:* to enable IAM delegation; it does not give every IAM identity key access.
- Creating a key programmatically without a key policy produces the account IAM-delegation statement as its default policy.
- The console default policy adds selected key administrators and key users to the account-delegation statement.
- For symmetric encryption keys, the console key-user statement grants Encrypt, Decrypt, ReEncrypt, GenerateDataKey, and DescribeKey permissions.
- Policy-based cross-account key access requires an allow in the owning key policy and an allow in the caller account IAM policy.
- A grant gives a grantee specified allowed operations on one KMS key without editing key or IAM policies.
- Authorized callers remove grant permissions by retiring or revoking the grant.
- AWS services commonly create grants to use KMS keys for a task and retire them when the task finishes.
- Encryption-context constraints can limit grant permissions for symmetric encryption keys.
Envelope encryption and context
Envelope encryptionA method that encrypts data with a data key and encrypts that key under another key. protects data with a data keyA symmetric key used outside KMS to encrypt and decrypt application data. and protects that data key with a KMS key. A data key is a symmetric keyA key where the same secret is used for encryption and decryption., one secret used for both encryption and decryption. The file stays in the application; KMS protects the smaller key.
How it works
- Call
GenerateDataKeywith a symmetric encryption KMS key. The normal response includes the data key in plaintextData in its readable unencrypted form., its readable form, and an encrypted copy. - Encrypt application data locally with the plaintext data key. The encrypted result is ciphertextData transformed by encryption that must be decrypted to recover the original.. Remove the plaintext key from memory after use.
- Store the encrypted data keyA data key stored in encrypted form for later decryption by its protecting key. alongside the ciphertext. KMS does not store or track those data keys for the application.
- To read the data, send the encrypted data key to KMS
Decrypt. If encryption contextNon-secret key-value information authenticated with symmetric-key ciphertext. was supplied, provide exactly the same key-value pairs, including case. - Use the returned plaintext data key to decrypt the application data locally, then erase the key from memory again.
Encryption context is optional non-secret key-value information authenticated with symmetric-key ciphertext. It binds meaning to the encrypted value: changing or omitting the original context prevents decryption. Context can also limit access in policies and grantsA removable permission allowing a grantee selected operations on one KMS key.. It appears in plaintext in CloudTrail, so keep secrets out of it.
Exam cues
- If the question says encrypt a large file, think envelope encryption, because symmetric KMS
Encryptaccepts only 4096 plaintext bytes. - If the question says decrypt is authorized but fails after context changes, think an exact context mismatch, because context is authenticated with the ciphertext.
- If the question says partners lack AWS credentials but need to encrypt, think an asymmetric public key, because they can encrypt outside AWS while the private key stays in KMS.
Remember
GenerateDataKey: plaintext data key plus encrypted copy in a normal response.- Keep the encrypted data key; erase its plaintext after local use.
- Symmetric
Encrypt: 4096 bytes; asymmetric limits depend on the algorithm and key type. - Encryption context works with symmetric encryption keys, not asymmetric or HMACA keyed authentication code used to verify data integrity and authenticity. keys.
Trap: Encryption context is not a secret channel. CloudTrail logs it in plaintext.
The application calls GenerateDataKey under a symmetric encryption KMS key.
KMS returns plaintext and encrypted copies; the application encrypts locally and erases the plaintext key.
The application stores ciphertext alongside the encrypted data key.
The application sends the encrypted data key and original encryption context to KMS Decrypt.
KMS returns the plaintext data key for local decryption; the application erases it after use.
From the AWS docs (14)
- A data key is a symmetric key used outside KMS to encrypt application data.
- GenerateDataKey normally returns a plaintext data key and a copy encrypted under a specified symmetric encryption KMS key.
- The application encrypts data locally with the plaintext data key and removes that key from memory after use.
- Store the encrypted data key with the encrypted application data.
- Call KMS Decrypt on the encrypted data key, decrypt data locally with the returned plaintext key, then erase the plaintext key.
- KMS does not store, manage, or track the application data keys it generates.
- Encrypt with SYMMETRIC_DEFAULT supports at most 4096 bytes of plaintext.
- The Encrypt plaintext limit for asymmetric encryption keys depends on the selected key type and algorithm.
- Encryption context is optional non-secret key-value data authenticated with symmetric-key ciphertext.
- Decrypting a ciphertext or encrypted data key requires the same encryption context used during encryption, with exact case-sensitive matching.
- Encryption context is not encrypted and appears in plaintext in CloudTrail logs.
- Encryption context can restrict access through policy conditions and grant constraints.
- Asymmetric and HMAC KMS operations do not support encryption context.
- With an asymmetric KMS key, the private key never leaves KMS, while the public key can be downloaded so users who cannot call KMS encrypt data outside AWS.
Key rotation
KMS rotation changes key materialThe secret cryptographic value used by a key in cryptographic operations., the secret cryptographic value behind a key, while automatic and on-demand rotation keep the same logical key. Manual rotation replaces the key resource and redirects future use to it.
How it works
-
Identify the key type and material originA property recording whether KMS generated key material or it came from an external source., which says whether KMS generated the material or you imported it.
Key type Automatic rotation On-demand rotation Manual replacement Symmetric encryption, standard store, AWS_KMSoriginOptional Supported Supported Symmetric encryption, imported EXTERNALmaterialUnsupported Supported Supported Asymmetric, HMACA keyed authentication code used to verify data integrity and authenticity., or custom-key-store key Unsupported Unsupported Required to replace material An asymmetric keyA mathematically related public key and private key pair. has a public and private key pair. An HMAC key generates and verifies a keyed authentication code, a value used to detect changed or unauthentic messages.
-
Enable automatic rotation for an eligible customer managed key. It is off by default. Once enabled, the default period is 365 days, configurable from 90 to 2560 days.
-
For eligible keys needing immediate rotation, use on-demand rotation. A key supports at most 25 on-demand rotations.
-
Keep the key ID and ARNAn identifier for an AWS resource. unchanged during automatic or on-demand rotation. For KMS-generated material, KMS retains older material and selects it when decrypting older ciphertextData transformed by encryption that must be decrypted to recover the original.. Stored data and generated data keysA symmetric key used outside KMS to encrypt and decrypt application data. are not re-encrypted or rotated.
-
For manual replacement, create a new key and redirect the application or aliasA name that points to a KMS key and can be redirected to another key., a name pointing to a KMS key. Keep track of the original key for operations on earlier data. An asymmetric decrypt or HMAC verification cannot use an alias that now points to a different key.
Custom automatic periods and on-demand rotation arrived in April 2024. AWS managed keys rotate annually; customers cannot change that setting.
The Config managed rule cmk-backing-key-rotation-enabled checks automatic rotation enablement and has no parameters.
Exam cues
- If the question says rotate every 180 days, think a custom automatic period on an eligible symmetric keyA key where the same secret is used for encryption and decryption., because the allowed range is 90 to 2560 days.
- If the question says enforce a maximum rotation age with the managed Config rule, think a custom age check, because the rule only tests enablement and has no parameters.
- If the question says rotation should rewrite all stored ciphertext, think a separate data re-encryption process, because KMS rotation does not rewrite data or data keys.
Remember
- Automatic: customer opt-in, 365-day default, 90 to 2560 days configurable.
- On-demand: supported symmetric keys, at most 25 rotations per key.
- Manual: new key resource and redirected future use.
- AWS managed keys: annual rotation controlled by AWS.
Trap: Rotating key material does not re-encrypt stored data or rotate data keys.
From the AWS docs (19)
- Automatic and on-demand rotation replace current key material within the same logical KMS key.
- Rotation within a KMS key preserves its key ID, ARN, policies, and permissions.
- KMS retains AWS_KMS-origin key material and chooses the version needed to decrypt older ciphertext.
- KMS key rotation does not rotate data keys or re-encrypt stored data.
- Automatic rotation supports symmetric encryption keys with KMS-generated material, AWS_KMS origin, in the standard store.
- Automatic rotation is disabled by default for customer managed keys.
- When automatic rotation is enabled without a custom period, its period is 365 days.
- A custom automatic rotation period can be 90 to 2560 days.
- On-demand rotation supports symmetric encryption customer managed keys with AWS_KMS or imported EXTERNAL material.
- A KMS key supports at most 25 on-demand rotations.
- Asymmetric keys, HMAC keys, and keys in custom key stores support neither automatic nor on-demand rotation.
- Manual rotation creates a new KMS key and redirects applications or aliases to it.
- After manual rotation, an asymmetric decrypt or HMAC verification must identify the original key, not an alias redirected to the replacement.
- AWS managed keys rotate annually and customers cannot change their rotation settings.
- GetKeyRotationStatus reports automatic rotation settings and on-demand rotation in progress.
- The cmk-backing-key-rotation-enabled managed Config rule checks whether automatic rotation is enabled and has no parameters.
- Custom automatic rotation periods and on-demand rotation were introduced in April 2024.
- An asymmetric key has a related public key and private key.
- HMAC keys generate and verify keyed authentication codes used to check data integrity and authenticity.
Multi-Region keys
Multi-Region KMS keys are related Regional keys with the same key ID and key materialThe secret cryptographic value used by a key in cryptographic operations.. An application can encrypt in one Region and decrypt through a related key in another Region, avoiding a call back to the first Region.
How it works
- Create a multi-Region primary key. This property is fixed at creation; an existing single-Region key cannot be converted.
- Explicitly create replicas in the Regions that need them. A replica is a fully usable related key, not a pointer to the primary. A related set has one primary and at most one related key per Region, within one AWS partitionA boundary separating groups of AWS Regions within which related keys can be replicated., a boundary separating groups of AWS Regions.
- For
AWS_KMSoriginA property recording whether KMS generated key material or it came from an external source., KMS transports key material to replicas within KMS. - Configure a key policyA resource permission document that controls access to one KMS key. and other local settings for each key. Policies, grantsA removable permission allowing a grantee selected operations on one KMS key., aliasesA name that points to a KMS key and can be redirected to another key., tags, descriptions, and enabled states are independent. Related keys have different ARNs because their Region components differ.
- Configure or initiate rotation on the primary. KMS synchronizes shared properties; each enabled replica can serve local cryptographic requests even when the primary is disabled.
| Property | Shared across related keys | Local responsibility |
|---|---|---|
| ID, material, origin, specification, algorithms, usage | Yes | Create replicas explicitly |
| Rotation | Yes | Configure or initiate it on the primary |
| Policy, grants, aliases, tags, description, enabled state | No | Manage each Regional key independently |
Exam cues
- If the question says decrypt in a recovery Region without a cross-Region KMS request, think related multi-Region keys, because they share the material needed for local decryption.
- If the question says a primary policy edit did not fix replica access, think the replica’s own policy, because policies are independent.
- If the question says the primary is disabled, think independently enabled replicas, because a replica can still perform cryptographic operationsAn operation that uses key material for work such as encryption, decryption, or authentication..
Remember
- Same key ID and material; different Regional ARNs.
- One primary per related set; create replicas explicitly.
- Rotation is controlled from the primary.
- Custom key stores do not support multi-Region keys.
- S3 replication still decrypts and re-encrypts data keysA symmetric key used outside KMS to encrypt and decrypt application data. under the destination key.
Trap: Multi-Region does not mean global access settings. Replicas need their own permissions and enabled state.
Create a related replica; KMS transports AWS_KMS-origin material to it.
The application in Region A uses its local key to encrypt.
The application makes the ciphertext available in Region B.
The application in Region B decrypts through the related local replica with its own permissions.
From the AWS docs (13)
- Related multi-Region keys share key ID and material so compatible ciphertext can be decrypted locally in another Region.
- Shared properties include key ID, material, material origin, key specification, encryption algorithms, key usage, and rotation.
- Policies, grants, aliases, tags, description, and enabled state are independent for each related key.
- Related multi-Region keys have different ARNs because the Region portion differs.
- Choose the multi-Region property when creating the key; it cannot later be changed.
- A related set has one primary key and at most one related key per Region, all within the same AWS partition.
- Create replica keys explicitly in selected Regions; KMS does not automatically choose Regions or create replicas.
- Configure automatic rotation or initiate on-demand rotation on the primary key only.
- For AWS_KMS-origin keys, KMS transports material from the primary to replicas within KMS.
- Each related key needs its own Regional key policy, and policy edits are not synchronized.
- A replica can perform cryptographic operations even when its primary key is disabled.
- Multi-Region keys cannot be created in a custom key store.
- S3 cross-Region replication still decrypts and re-encrypts data keys under the destination key even when related multi-Region keys are used.
Custom key stores
A KMS custom key storeA protected location where cryptographic key material is stored and used. lets KMS use key materialThe secret cryptographic value used by a key in cryptographic operations. held in a key manager you control. It meets requirements for dedicated hardware or external key custody while retaining the KMS interface. A hardware security moduleA specialized hardware device for protecting and using cryptographic secrets. (HSM) is a specialized device that protects and uses cryptographic secrets.
How it works
- Start with the requirement for key custody, meaning where material is held and who controls it. AWS recommends a custom store when that requirement explicitly calls for customer-controlled single-tenantDedicated to one customer rather than shared among customers. HSMs, dedicated to one customer, or external key management.
- For a CloudHSM key store, create or select a customer-owned clusterA group of CloudHSM devices managed together as the backing key store., a group of HSMs. Setup requires at least two active HSMs in different Availability Zones and a dedicated crypto userA CloudHSM user account that can perform cryptographic operations on cluster keys., the cluster account KMS uses. Connect the store before using its keys.
- For an external key store, operate a key manager outside AWS and an external key store (XKS) proxy, software that passes and translates requests between KMS and that manager. The external key material remains outside AWS.
- Keep these dependencies available. A disconnected CloudHSM store cannot perform KMS cryptographic operationsAn operation that uses key material for work such as encryption, decryption, or authentication.. For XKS, the external manager and proxy add availability, durability, and latency responsibilities.
| Store choice | Where material is held and used | Operational responsibility |
|---|---|---|
| Standard KMS | AWS-managed HSM infrastructure | AWS manages infrastructure |
| CloudHSM key store | Customer-owned CloudHSM cluster in AWS | Customer manages the cluster and connection |
| External key store | External key manager outside AWS | Customer operates manager, proxy, and connectivity |
Importing material into a standard key store gives control over its generation and removal, but places it in KMS. It does not meet an external-only custody requirement.
Exam cues
- If the question says dedicated HSMs controlled by the customer in AWS, think a CloudHSM key store, because its cluster holds and uses the material.
- If the question says the external key must stay outside AWS, think XKS, because KMS calls a proxy connected to the external manager.
- If the question says key operations failed after a store disconnect, think its connection and backing manager, because IAM cannot replace a working key-store dependency.
Remember
- Custom stores support symmetric encryption keys only.
- No asymmetric or HMACA keyed authentication code used to verify data integrity and authenticity. keys, imported material, multi-Region keys, automatic rotation, or on-demand rotation.
- Standard-store availability SLAA service commitment describing the availability level offered by a provider.: 99.999 percent. The KMS comparison lists no KMS availability SLA for custom stores.
- Custom stores add cost, operational work, and lower performance.
Trap: Customer-generated material imported into KMS is not an external key store. External custody requires XKS.
The application makes a KMS request using its configured permissions.
KMS uses the connected customer-owned CloudHSM cluster for the cryptographic operation.
The application makes a KMS request for an external-store key.
KMS sends the request to the customer-provided XKS proxy.
The proxy calls the external manager and returns its response to KMS.
From the AWS docs (16)
- A key store is the protected location where key material is stored and used.
- Standard KMS keys are protected by hardware security modules, specialized devices for protecting and using cryptographic secrets.
- AWS recommends custom key stores for requirements explicitly mandating customer-controlled single-tenant HSMs or key management outside AWS.
- A CloudHSM key store associates KMS keys with a customer-owned CloudHSM cluster, where key material and cryptographic operations reside.
- CloudHSM key store setup requires at least two active HSMs in different Availability Zones and a dedicated crypto user for KMS.
- Disconnecting a CloudHSM key store prevents KMS cryptographic operations using its keys.
- An external key store keeps its external key material and cryptographic processing in a key manager outside AWS.
- KMS communicates with an external key manager through customer-provided external key store proxy software.
- The customer is responsible for external key manager and proxy availability, durability, and latency.
- Custom key stores support only symmetric encryption KMS keys.
- Custom key stores do not support asymmetric keys, HMAC keys, imported material, or multi-Region keys.
- Custom-key-store keys support neither automatic nor on-demand KMS rotation.
- The standard key store has a 99.999 percent KMS availability SLA.
- The KMS key-store comparison lists no KMS availability SLA for CloudHSM and external key stores.
- Custom key stores add cost and operational complexity and have lower performance than the standard store.
- Importing material into the standard store gives control over material generation and removal but keeps that imported material in KMS.
Flashcards
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What is the difference between encryption at rest and encryption in transit on AWS?
- At rest: protects stored data, such as in Amazon S3, Amazon EBS or a database
- In transit: protects data moving between systems, usually with TLS
Which AWS service creates and controls the keys used to encrypt data in services such as Amazon S3, Amazon EBS and Amazon RDS?
AWS Key Management Service (AWS KMS). Its keys stay inside FIPS 140-3 validated HSMs and never leave unencrypted.
A website on AWS needs a TLS certificate for HTTPS that renews automatically. Which AWS service provides it?
AWS Certificate Manager (ACM). It creates, stores and renews SSL/TLS certificates, which encrypt data in transit.
Why is encrypting data stored on AWS one of the benefits of cloud security?
Encrypted data is unreadable without the key, so a stolen copy of storage is useless; AWS services make encryption a setting, managed with AWS KMS.
Which AWS service creates and controls encryption keys that can protect an Amazon RDS database?
AWS Key Management Service (AWS KMS) creates and controls keys and integrates with Amazon RDS encryption.
A company uploads new objects to Amazon S3 without configuring encryption. Are they stored unencrypted?
No. Since January 5, 2023, S3 encrypts all new uploads with SSE-S3 (AES-256) automatically, at no extra cost.
Which of these encrypt data by default with no setting to change: CloudTrail log files, Storage Gateway data in S3, a new Amazon EFS file system created through the API?
CloudTrail log files (SSE-S3) and Storage Gateway data (SSE-S3, plus TLS in transit). EFS encryption at rest is a setting chosen when the file system is created.
Are new Amazon Redshift provisioned clusters encrypted by default?
Yes, since January 10, 2025, unless they are restored from a snapshot.
Which three kinds of KMS keys exist, and which one does a customer fully control?
Customer managed keys (full control), AWS managed keys (created by a service in your account) and AWS owned keys (owned by the service).
Does an IAM allow policy alone authorize an identity to use an AWS KMS key?
Only if the key policy enables IAM delegation. The default account-principal statement enables delegation; it does not automatically grant key use to every identity. IAM denies still apply.
An application role has an IAM allow for kms:Decrypt but an AWS KMS call is denied. Which authorization settings should it check?
Check whether the key policy enables IAM delegation and whether an explicit deny applies. For policy-based access from another account, both the key policy and caller IAM policy must allow it.
An application in account B must decrypt using a customer managed KMS key in account A through policies. Which accounts need policy changes?
Allow the external caller in the key policy in A and delegate the required key operation through the caller IAM policy in B.
An AWS service needs temporary AWS KMS key access for a task without repeated key-policy edits. Which permission mechanism fits?
Use a grant with only the required operations, optionally constrained by encryption context. Retire or revoke it when access is no longer needed.
An application must encrypt a large file that exceeds AWS KMS Encrypt capacity. What design fits?
Use envelope encryption: call
GenerateDataKey, encrypt locally with its plaintext data key, erase that key, and store the encrypted data key with the ciphertext. SymmetricEncryptsupports only 4096 plaintext bytes.What is AWS KMS encryption context and what must a decrypting caller supply?
Non-secret key-value data authenticated with the ciphertext. Supply exactly the original context, including case. It can restrict policies and grants and is visible in CloudTrail.
A team wants to put a secret identifier value in AWS KMS encryption context to hide it from logs. What should it do?
Keep sensitive values out of the context. It is not encrypted and appears in plaintext in CloudTrail logs.
An application stored a large encrypted file and its encrypted data key. How should it decrypt the file with AWS KMS?
Send the encrypted data key to KMS
Decrypt, using the original context if one was supplied. Use the returned plaintext data key locally, then erase it.Partners without AWS credentials must encrypt files that only your application can decrypt. Which KMS key type fits?
An asymmetric KMS key. Partners encrypt with the downloaded public key; decryption happens in KMS with the private key, which never leaves it.
What are the default and configurable periods for automatic AWS KMS rotation, and what remains unchanged?
Once enabled, the default is 365 days; choose 90 to 2560 days for eligible symmetric AWS_KMS-origin keys. The key ID and ARN stay the same, and old ciphertext remains decryptable with retained material.
Which AWS KMS keys require manual replacement rather than automatic or on-demand rotation?
Asymmetric keys, HMAC keys, and custom-key-store keys. Create a new key and redirect the application or alias. Imported symmetric keys support on-demand rotation, but not automatic rotation.
A team rotates an AWS KMS key and expects stored application data and data keys to change. What happens?
Only the current KMS key material changes. Existing data is not re-encrypted and data keys are not rotated.
A team needs an eligible customer managed AWS KMS key to rotate annually while old ciphertext stays readable. What should it enable?
Enable automatic rotation with the default 365-day period. KMS retains earlier AWS_KMS-origin material for decryption while preserving the key ID.
A team requires a 180-day AWS KMS automatic rotation period. Can the managed Config rotation rule enforce that age through a parameter?
No. Configure the eligible key period, then use a custom age check if needed.
cmk-backing-key-rotation-enabledhas no parameters and checks enablement, not rotation age.Which properties do related AWS KMS multi-Region keys share, and which must be managed independently?
Shared: key ID, material, origin, specification, algorithms, usage, and rotation. Independent: policies, grants, aliases, tags, description, and enabled state. Configure rotation on the primary.
Can an existing single-Region AWS KMS key become multi-Region, or can a multi-Region key use a custom key store?
No. The multi-Region property is fixed at creation, and custom key stores do not support multi-Region keys. S3 replication also continues re-encrypting data keys even with related multi-Region keys.
An application must decrypt the same protected data in a recovery Region without making a KMS call to the failed Region. Which key design fits?
Use related multi-Region keys and authorize the application on the local replica. Their matching material and key ID support local decryption.
A team changes the AWS KMS multi-Region primary key policy, but its recovery Region still denies access. Why?
Key policies are independent and are not synchronized. Update the policy on the relevant Regional key.
A primary AWS KMS multi-Region key is disabled. Does that disable a related enabled replica?
No. Enabled state is independent, and a replica can perform cryptographic operations while the primary is disabled.
When should an AWS KMS design choose a CloudHSM key store or an external key store?
Choose CloudHSM for a requirement to protect material in customer-controlled single-tenant HSMs in AWS. Choose an external key store when external keys must stay outside AWS. Both support only symmetric encryption keys and add operational dependencies.
A policy requires KMS-integrated encryption with key material protected by dedicated HSMs controlled by the customer in AWS. Which store fits?
A CloudHSM key store. Setup requires at least two active HSMs in different Availability Zones and a dedicated KMS crypto user.
A policy requires external key material never to be imported into AWS. Should the team use imported KMS material or an external key store?
Use an external key store. Importing material places it in KMS; an external key store uses a key manager outside AWS through a proxy.
An application loses KMS cryptographic access when its CloudHSM key store is disconnected. Can an IAM policy restore that access alone?
No. Reconnect the store and restore its cluster availability. KMS cannot perform those operations while the store is disconnected.
Can an AWS KMS custom key store satisfy a requirement for multi-Region keys and automatic rotation?
No. Custom key stores support neither multi-Region keys nor automatic or on-demand KMS rotation.